4.00 (R.N.)

3.21 (M.G.)

0.20 (R.N.)

0.18 (M.G.)

2011-12

0.48 (R.N.)

0.41 (M.G.)

1.27 (R.N.)

0.77 (M.G.)

0.25 (R.N.)

0.48 (M.G.)

3.73 (R.N.)

3.36 (M.G.)

0.23 (R.N.)

0.25 (M.G.)

2010-11

0.45 (R.N.)

0.29 (M.G.)

1.21 (R.N.)

0.74 (M.G.)

0.25 (R.N.)

0.35 (M.G.)

4.06 (R.N.)

3.09 (M.G.)

0.18 (R.N.)

0.26 (M.G.)

The only category with year to year consistency is PIM, where Nash's roughly one PIM per two games is ahead of Gaborik's output, particularly over the past two seasons. Blocked Shots have been back and forth, with Gaborik's past advantage morphing into Nash holding a comparable edge, likely due to the emphasis (even in the post-Tortorella era) on Blocked Shots in New York.

Hits had been owned by Nash until he somehow only managed 11 in 65 games during 2013-14, which was a huge drop from his 1+ Hit per game over the past three seasons. But at the same time Gaborik's Hits output has dropped from okay to below average, although I feel some of that has to do with being on two teams in each of the past two seasons and focusing more on offense, which also would explain his drop in Blocked Shots output.

Just as Nash's Hits have fallen precipitously, his PP output plummeted in 2013-14 as well. And a drop of roughly 50% versus his average from the prior three seasons is not in line with his 20% drop in PP Ice Time, so we'll have to see if unsustainably bad luck might've been to blame, at least in part. We can also see that Gaborik's PP output was down, albeit not by much; and again, that could be a question of fitting in with new teams. But we should examine his luck-based metrics as well, to get a better overall picture.

Luck-Based Metrics

This data helps paint a clearer picture behind some – but certainly not all – of the numbers for each player. With Gaborik, his highest shooting % was in his most successful recent season of 2011-12, although 14.9% is barely above 12.9% and led to at most six more goals. Also, Gaborik's highest 5×5 PDO (and only one that was outside of the "normal" ceiling of 1030) was in his mediocre 2010-11 season, whereas his 5×5 PDO in his successful 2011-12 was 1019, which he repeated last season.

Nash's shooting percentage has been below his 12.4% career average, but not enormously. And although his 42 points in 44 games 2012-13 season was accompanied by a 1029 PDO at 5×5, he also posted a very respectable 66 points in 75 games in 2010-11 with a 1014 5×5 PDO.

The IPP data doesn't show much year to year aberration for either player. Clearly Gaborik trends high at 5×5, although the fact that he's been above 73% in three of these four seasons suggests those were not flukes and can be repeated. His 5×4 IPP has been similarly consistent. Nash's 5×5 IPP dropped last season, although even if he had managed to hit his normal 60% that would've meant only two more PP points. And Nash's 5×5 IPP last season was not low compared to his two most recent campaigns.

All in all, these numbers should be concerning for Nash owners, as bad luck does not appear to be to blame for his poor production last season. Meanwhile, nothing points to Gaborik being unable to match the production he achieved in his brief time with LA during 2013-14.

Who Wins?

The outlook for Nash is not good, unless it's for non-cap leagues that place a premium on Shots. The reality is Nash does not appear to be in the good graces of a coach who was able to take his team to the Cup Final despite treating Nash like a borderline top six player. And while the Rangers – on paper – have lost more offensive firepower than they added in the offseason, that might not be enough to vault Nash back into 60+ point territory given how last year unfolded.

On top of that, and as was the case last week when discussing Dustin Brown, there's a real concern that someone in most leagues will still see Nash as a solid bounce back candidate, making it more likely than not he'll have an unjustifiably high cost. And the problem is this isn't the kind of situation that would translate to Nash also having useful trade value, as it's one thing to reach for a player in a draft and another to assign him the same upside in a trade.

Gaborik's value is not easy to pinpoint, as although he performed very well for LA (69 point pace in achieving 38 points in 45 games between the regular season and playoffs) there's also the reality that the last time someone not named Anze Kopitar hit the 60 point mark for LA in a full season was way back in 2007-08. But still, in straight points leagues I'd opt for Gaborik due to less downside and a more realistic chance to produce 60+ points again.